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"PUBLIC-PRIVATE" HEALTH LAW:
MULTIPLE DIRECTIONS IN PUBLIC
HEALTH
NAN D. HUNTER*

No public law is more public than public health law. Its defining subject is the
use of state power to control and prevent death and disease.' Its primary institutions
are a cluster of state actors, the governmental agencies that comprise the American
public health "system.,, 2 The system grew out of the eighteenth century boards of
health that produced the beginnings of administrative law. Public health law is
grounded on statutory provisions that authorize various forms of state action and on
judicial decisions that resolve constitutional challenges to those actions.4
In some respects, this field is moving even closer to the core of governmental
functions. Since September 11 th and the 2001 anthrax attacks, public awareness of
the danger of bioterrorism has heightened. 5 Contingency planning for widespread
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1. Lawrence 0. Gostin, A Theory and Definition of Public Health Law, 10 J. HEALTH CARE L. &
POL'Y 1, 1 (2007). Within the broad scope of promoting population health, approaches vary among
nations. David P. Fidler, A Globalized Theory of Public Health Law, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 150 (2002).
2. Hugh Tilson & Bobbie Berkowitz, The PublicHealth Enterprise: Examining Our Twenty-FirstCentury Policy Challenges, 25 HEALTH AFF. 900, 904 (2006) ("[T]he building blocks for the public
health system are the network of nearly 3,000 local public health agencies and . . .public health
departments.").
3. WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW & REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY

AMERICA 202 (1996).
4. BERNARD J. TURNOCK, PUBLIC HEALTH: WHAT IT Is AND How IT WORKS 133-37 (3d ed.
2004). See generally LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT (2000)
(discussing the relationship between government power and public health and discussing the executive,
legislative, and judicial roles in public health endeavors).
5. JEANNE GUILLEMIN, BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: FROM THE INVENTION OF STATE-SPONSORED

PROGRAMS TO CONTEMPORARY BIOTERRORISM 167 (2005). Within the federal government, greater
awareness of and funding for anti-bioterrorism efforts began in the 1990s. JONATHAN B. TUCKER,
SCOURGE: THE ONCE AND FUTURE THREAT OF SMALLPOX 191-95,244-45(2001).
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infectious disease, whether resulting from a natural outbreak or the hostile release
of a pathogen, has mushroomed. 6 Should such an outbreak occur, federal law
provides for the declaration of a national emergency or disaster. 7 Beyond formal
declarations, the conceptual framework of emergency preparedness and response
subsumes ever larger segments of the field of public health. Authorizations of8
funding for public health activities underscore the need to prepare for emergencies,
and contingency planning has been folded into an all-hazards framework that
channels public health policy and programs. 9 As of July 2006, thirty-eight
legislatures and the District of Columbia had adopted, at least in part, state-level
health emergency statutes.' 0
Emergency planning has become an important discourse of governance, one
which reveals a great deal about the operations of state power. The field of
emergency public health planning comprises much more than a set of procedures
for who should do what in extraordinary situations. The need to control a serious
infectious disease outbreak, for example, creates opportunities for the enlargement
of the government's coercive powers and for potential abuses that can leave
permanent scars on the body politic. It also raises important questions about
whether emergency responses and protections by government are too weak,
especially for disempowered communities. Debates over the use of military
personnel for law enforcement exemplify these dilemmas."
Paired with this reinvigoration of command and control models for public
health is a new trend toward enlarging the influence of the private sector in health
emergency planning. The reach of public health law is extending beyond the state
at the same time that it is intensifying the power of the state. Increasingly, private
sector entities are implicated in the state's matrix of collaborative institutions.
In this article, I identify three approaches to governance embedded in today's
public health law and policy. These approaches align with internal tensions within
the public health field that pull it in multiple and conflicting directions. Three
distinct reconfigurations of law and policy are developing.

6. See, e.g., Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 304, 116 Stat. 2165 (codified
at 6 U.S.C. § 184 & 42 U.S.C. § 233); Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.);
see also Bill Frist, Public Health & National Security: The Critical Role of Increased FederalSupport,
21 HEALTH AFF. 117, 120-21 (2002).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5170, 5191 (2000 & Supp. 2003).
8. Kristine M. Gebbie & Bernard J. Turnock, The Public Health Workforce, 2006: New
Challenges, 25 HEALTH AFF. 923, 925-27 (2006) (describing the increases in federal funding to support
the public health workforce while noting that state and local funding may be "replace[d] or
supplant[ed]" by this federal funding, resulting in a net reduction of the number of public health
positions).
9. Tilson & Berkowitz, supra note 2, at 905.
10. CTR. FOR LAW & THE PUB.'S HEALTH AT GEORGETOWN & JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVS., THE
MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT (MSEHPA): STATE LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY (2006),

http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA%20Leg%20Activity.pdf.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 57-60.
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The first approach to governance that is evident in public health law is the
most traditional and conventional one, that of dominant state authority. What is
notable is how this approach is being strengthened by a trend toward greater
centralization and hierarchy in infectious disease control, pushing public health into
a tighter command and control structure. This trend is counter to virtually every
other development in the world of civilian government or governance, where
arguments for devolution and horizontal management dominate the best practices
literature. Operating alone, this trend would lead to the traditional government
model of public health becoming even more state-centric than it is already. Two
other developments counteract it, however.
The second governance construct in the public health field is the publicprivate model for administrative governance, which constitutes the most commonly
examined branch of new governance theory. 12 Public-private models for
administrative governance are relatively new to public health. They are more
common in other areas of law that are concerned more with large-scale regulated
industries. 13 Today, however, calls for partnerships with the private sector for the
purpose of achieving population health goals are growing. 14
The third governance model now evident in the public health field illustrates
governmentality theory, a critical theory cousin to the administrative governance
literature. Governmentality theory incorporates the recognition that the state
already permeates the private sector even without formal authority.' 5 What is key is
not whether the state occupies a position of command or of partnership, but the
insight that power flows back and forth between public and private entities through
a multiplicity of channels and technologies. 16 Both sectors generate and enforce
policies that govern the health of a population and that govern a population through
its health. 17 One current trend that illustrates this dynamic of governance is an
emerging branch of public health emergency policy that would utilize indirect and

12. Lester Salamon first used the phrase "new governance," which he described as a new paradigm
distinct from traditional public administration and relying on systematic collaborative public and private
sector approaches to policy issues. Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public
Action: An Introduction, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE 1, 1-14
(Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002). See infra Part II for elaboration of what "new governance" connotes.
13. See, e.g., NEIL GUNNINGHAM ET AL., SMART REGULATION: DESIGNING ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY 145-372 (Keith Hawkins ed., 1998) (discussing the regulatory nature of the chemical and
agriculture industries).

14. See infra Part lI.B.
15. See generally MITCHELL DEAN, GOVERNMENTALITY: POWER AND RULE IN MODERN SOCIETY
(1999).
16. Id.; ALAN HUNT & GARY WICKHAM, FOUCAULT AND LAW: TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGY OF LAW
AS GOVERNANCE 22-23 (1994); JANET NEWMAN, MODERNISING GOVERNANCE: NEW LABOUR, POLICY
AND SOCIETY 22-25 (2001).

17. DEAN, supra note 15, at 20-21; NEWMAN, supra note 16, at 42-44; Sarah Nettleton, Governing
the Risky Sel. How to Become Healthy, Wealthy and Wise, in FOUCAULT: HEALTH AND MEDICINE 20722 (Alan Peterson & Robin Bunton eds., 1997).
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through workplace management, to
non-coercive governance methods, channeled
8
disease.1
infectious
of
control the spread
I am intentionally drawing the distinction between these three models in
somewhat exaggerated form. Governments in the twenty-first century operate in
sophisticated ways, blurring the line between public and private. In a complicated
world of interlinked institutions, my categories cannot be pristine. But they point to
distinct approaches that complexify the traditional understanding of public health
law as a medicalized form of administrative procedure.
Part I of this article analyzes the meanings and dangers that accompany the
first trend, the shift of public health authority for coercive interventions deeper into
the national security state. Both the proposed new regulations for federal quarantine
authority and a series of emergency planning documents are directed toward the
goal of maximizing the power of government. They evidence little concern for
checks against arbitrary uses of that power and reflect broader attempts to
instantiate the principles of a unitary executive philosophy.
Part II describes my taxonomy of new governance theory in greater detail and
analyzes specific examples of each in current public health policy. I describe how
new administrative governance models for public-private sector partnerships are
growing in public health generally and in emergency planning specifically.
Applying the governmentality frame, I argue that proposals for "modem
quarantine," which would institute quarantine restrictions by relying on voluntary
compliance, illustrate a complex use of both institutional and individual choices to
advance state goals.
Part III uses modem quarantine proposals as a case study for examining how
the workplace could function as as a venue for health governance. Paradoxically,
this approach, based on the enablement of voluntary, self-protective instincts,
cannot succeed absent an array of legal supports emanating from the state, a reality
that is being overlooked in official policy documents.
In conclusion, I consider the consequences of these simultaneous and partially
contradictory developments for our understanding of a public health "system." I
argue that these three trends taken together illustrate the complexities found
throughout contemporary American government: how the same apparatus can be
intensifying as a security state while at the same time, on the same set of issues,
deploying new governance rhetoric. Part of the intellectual richness of public health
is that it is a field in which scholars have the opportunity to analyze and critique
examples of new governance models as they develop in a traditionally public law
field.

18. See infra Part II.C.
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I.

HEALTH SECURITY AS A DISCOURSE OF GOVERNANCE

The oldest traditional function of public health has been the control of
communicable disease. 19 The police powers authority, as applied to public health,
originated in the adoption of self-protective policies by which localities sought to
defend themselves against the spread of infection. 20 Early public health efforts were
framed in the language and imagery of self-defense and national security, allusions
that rang starkly true before antibiotics and vaccines offered medical alternatives to
a traditional reliance on the exclusion of disease carriers. 2 1 Boards of health, local
or state legislatures, and police departments were the sources and enforcers of
22
public health policy.
Public health is thus an archetype of traditional government as a mode of
governance. It has relied almost exclusively on the public sector to channel
individuals and resources toward the achievement of broad social goals. The
structure, functions, and professional culture of public health all signify a dominant
state apparatus for directing the distribution of public goods. Public health
policymaking and implementation exemplify the use of traditional regulatory
mechanisms rather than the decentralized, often privatized structures and
procedures associated with new governance theory.
During the last five years, one major trend in public health has been to
become even more government centric. Contemporary public health policymaking
occurs within the broader context of emergency planning and an undefined,
undeclared war. Security and self-defense furnish the dominant tropes for the
cultural register of this governance narrative. Federal public health discourse is
returning, at least metaphorically, to its quasi-military roots in the Marine Hospital
Service, established for merchant seamen, which became the uniformed Public
Health Service, a civilian officer corps.23
The phrase "health security" itself also illustrates the change. Advocates of
universal access to health care used the phrase "health security" in the promotion of
reform proposals; the allusion was to a completion of the social insurance project
begun with Social Security. 24 Today, "health security" most often refers to a form

19. TURNOCK, supra note 4, at 3-7. For a spirited argument that battling communicable disease
should remain the sole activity of public health, see Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the "Old" Public
Health: The Legal Frameworkfor the Regulation of Public Health, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1421 (2004).

20. NOVAK, supra note 3, at 197.
21. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905) ("Upon the principle of selfdefense, of paramount necessity, a community has the right to protect itself against an epidemic of
disease which threatens the safety of its members."); see also NOVAK, supranote 3, at 211-13.
22. NOVAK, supra note 3, at 198-202; see, e.g., Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10, 17, 21-22 (N.D.
Cal. 1900).
23. FITZHUGH MULLAN, PLAGUES AND POLITICS: THE STORY OF THE UNITED STATES PUBLIC
HEALTH SERVICE 14-31 (1989).
24. WHITE HOUSE DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL, HEALTH SECURITY: THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT TO
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 2, 17-18, 33-34, 93-94 (1993); WHITE HOUSE DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL, THE
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of national defense.2 5 This linguistic change marks a shift in the public imaginery
regarding what constitutes protective health policy, away from a concern with
assuring access to a public good and toward a concern with guarding against
disaster. It also marks the melding of public health and the security state. As then
Secretary of Health and Human Services Donna Shalala told the press in 1999,
"[t]his is the first time in American history in which the 26public health system has
been directly integrated into the national security system.,
The most frightening point of overlap between the threats posed by a hostile
attack and those resulting from naturally occurring health emergencies may become
manifest in the event of an emerging infectious disease for which available medical
treatments are inadequate. Many of the pathogens most likely to be deployed as
weapons in a bioterrorist attack would be frightening, not only because of the
revelation that an enemy has control of such weapons, but also because effective
treatments and prophylactics either do not exist or cannot be produced quickly
enough and in sufficient quantity to immediately protect the population.27
Similarly, if a naturally occurring mutant influenza virus produced pandemic
disease, pharmaceutical responses would likely become available significantly
28
behind the curve of transmission.
Command and control, in some form, is surely an indispensable mode for
governmental response to an emergency. The efficiency and speed of top-down
responses in moments of crisis have obvious attractions. But in a form of mission
creep and professional norm migration, all aspects of health emergency policy have
shifted toward the framework of enhanced executive authority. Especially when no
intentional hostile act caused the emergency, this perspective crowds out the
possibility of using alternative approaches such as a human rights framework.29

PRESIDENT'S HEALTH SECURITY PLAN 3, 5-6, 14 (1993). Some use of the phrase in this way continues.
See, e.g., The Health Security Campaign, http://www.healthsecurity.org (last visited Dec. 19, 2006).
25. Frist, supra note 6, at 118-19; Eileen Salinsky & Elin A. Gursky, The Case for Transforming
GovernmentalPublic Health, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1017, 1022, 1025 (2006).
26. GUILLEMIN, supra note 5, at 235 n.65.
27. RICHARD A. FALKENRATH ET AL., AMERICA'S ACHILLES' HEEL: NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND

CHEMICAL TERRORISM AND COVERT ATTACK 151-54 (1998); Lawrence 0. Gostin, When Terrorism
Threatens Health: How FarAre Limitations on Personaland Economic Liberties Justified?, 55 FLA. L.
REV. 1105, 1170 (2003); Barry Kellman, Biological Terrorism: Legal Measures for Preventing
Catastrophe,24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 417, 432-37 (2001).
28. U.S.

HOMELAND

SEC.

COUNCIL,

NATIONAL

STRATEGY

FOR

PANDEMIC

INFLUENZA:

at
(2006),
available
PLAN
198
IMPLEMENTATION
http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/nspi-implementation.pdf [hereinafter HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL]
("A specific pandemic influenza vaccine cannot be produced until a pandemic influenza strain emerges
and is identified. Once a pandemic influenza virus has been identified, it will likely take 4-6 months to
develop, test, and begin producing a vaccine.").
29. Wendy K. Mariner, Law and Public Health: Beyond Emergency Preparedness,38 J. HEALTH
L. 247, 270-76 (2005).
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A.

Legal Powers

The tendency to expand the public health power of government toward
coercive ends is reflected in proposed federal regulations for the imposition of
quarantine orders. 30 The proposed regulations provide for sweeping powers to
detain individuals based on the Centers for Disease Control's (CDC) "reasonable
belief' that an individual may have been exposed to a particular disease when the
individual has moved or is about to move interstate, or when the individual is a
probable source of infection to persons moving interstate, 3' a description that fits
vast numbers of people in a highly mobile society.
If they become final, the proposed regulations would permit extraordinary
controls by legitimizing a dense concentration of power in federal health officials.
The CDC Director or the Secretary of Health and Human Services would have the
power to determine that a public health emergency exists, upon finding a
"significant potential" for interstate spread of an infectious disease. This
declaration would trigger immediate authority to detain persons subject to minimal
oversight. The regulations would provide for both "provisional quarantine" and
"quarantine." Provisional quarantine may last up to three business days, while
quarantine may last for a significantly longer period of time.33
The proposed regulations are framed to allow actions to interrupt transmission
without requiring certainty that disease spread is likely to occur. Individuals who
are thought to have only a "pre-communicable" stage of the disease may be
restricted through either "provisional quarantine" or "quarantine." 34 The standard
for both quarantine orders suggests, but does not require, that the CDC Director
have actual evidence of clinical manifestations or test results.35 That is, both
quarantine and provisional quarantine orders may be based on "other evidence of
36
exposure or infection available to the Director at the time."
Although such immediate actions may be effective in eliminating risk, careful
attention to individual rights is missing from the proposed regulations. The
proposed regulations would allow provisional quarantine to be imposed simply by a
written or verbal order or by "actual movement restrictions. 37 A person under

30. Control of Communicable Diseases, 70 Fed. Reg. 71,892 (proposed Nov. 30, 2005) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 70).
31. Id. at 71,932-33. Part 70 of the proposed regulations concerns persons moving in interstate
commerce; Part 71 addresses persons entering the United States from another country. For the sake of
simplicity, my discussion is limited to the interstate travel context. Comparable provisions exist for
international travel. See, e.g., id. at 71,942.
32. Id. at 71,930.
33. Id. at 71,932-33.
34. Id. at 71,930. There is no definition provided for "pre-communicable." Id.
35. Id. at 71,933.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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regular quarantine may request a hearing, but no hearing is available for persons in
provisional quarantine.38
Moreover, many of the most fundamental indicia of due process are missing
from the proposed system of hearings for quarantine. The CDC Director would
designate the hearing officer. 39 There is no requirement of an independent judge at
any point in the administrative review procedure even though this is a bedrock
component of due process. 40 Although a person can designate a "representative" for
the review hearing, 41 there is no provision for counsel to be appointed if the
individual cannot afford an attorney. The proposed regulations do not address what
the evidentiary burden would be or who would bear it. The hearings are limited to
"genuine and substantial issues of fact. ' 42
The overall scheme embodied in the regulations fails to satisfy constitutional
due process requirements. The Department of Health and Human Services argues
that the existence of habeas corpus will serve the function of providing for a
meaningful hearing.43 But requiring an individual to initiate habeas corpus is a
significant decrement from the constitutional norm for reviewing deprivations of
liberty based on the individual posing a risk to the public's health. 4 4 In addition, a
critical omission throughout the proposed regulations is the absence of a
requirement that less restrictive alternatives be preferred to greater infringements
on liberty.45 In sum, the balance struck is overwhelmingly in favor of state power.
B.

Planningand Response Policy

Beyond the parameters of regulatory law, the conceptual model for public
health emergency response situations is also moving in subtle ways toward a
national security or quasi-military norm. Federal public health emergency policies
are part of the National Response Plan (NRP), an "all-hazards" framework for

38. Id.at 71,895.
39. Id. at 71,934.
40. Cf Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (identifying a neutral decision-maker as
necessary for hearings of persons detained as enemy combatants).
41. Control of Communicable Diseases, 70 Fed. Reg. at 71,934.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 71,896.
44. For example, persons facing civil commitment on mental health grounds for posing a risk of
harm to others receive judicial review of such orders without having to invoke the power of habeas
corpus. See, e.g., Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412-13 (2002); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346
(1997).
45. The mandate to exhaust less restrictive alternatives exists under state law. E.g., City of New
York v. Antoinette R., 630 N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1009 (N.Y. 1995) (upholding a statute permitting
involuntary detention of a woman with active tuberculosis in a hospital setting where the statute
provided "due process safeguards," including "review of less restrictive alternatives which were
attempted or considered"); City of Newark v. J.S., 652 A.2d 265, 272 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993)
(requiring that, in order to involuntarily commit a homeless man diagnosed with tuberculosis, "[tihe
terms of confinement must minimize the infringements on liberty and enhance autonomy" and "[i]esser
forms of restraint must be used when they would suffice to fulfill the government interests").
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governmental action in emergencies.46 Adopted in 2004, the NRP delineates
triggers for types of governmental responses, the roles and responsibilities of
different actors, and the operational functions to be implemented when Incidents of
National Significance (INS) are declared.47 The operations system designed by the
NRP to go into effect when a crisis occurs is the National Incident Management
System (NIMS).48 When an INS occurs, the agency "with appropriate jurisdictional
authority" is to designate "a single Incident Commander with overall incident
management responsibility."49 When, as would often be the case, multiple agencies
would be involved, the agency Incident Commanders form a Unified Command.
"At the [Incident Command Post], the Unified Command develops the NIMS
incident command organizational structure in a top-down, modular fashion based
on the [s]ize and complexity of the incident [and the s]pecifics of the hazard
environment caused by the incident[.],,

50

Local health agencies have replicated the federal approach, creating a
consistent set of models and operational principles. In New York City, for example,
the Health Department's response to pandemic flu would be carried out under the
auspices of the Citywide Incident Management System (CIMS), led by the Office
of Emergency Management. 51 New York City's CIMS uses the same Unified
Command principles as the federal government's NIMS.52 Internally, the New
York City Health Department uses the Incident Command System.53
The exigencies of a disaster such as Hurricane Katrina illustrate the benefits
of an approach relying on a militarized model of structure and functions. There,
more rapid deployment of governmental resources almost certainly would have
saved lives and mitigated human suffering. 54 But top-down command models come
with a cost. They can produce quick responses, but they also silently align all
civilian emergency relief efforts, in any kind of emergency, with a military
approach.

46. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND

SEC.,

NATIONAL RESPONSE

i (2004),

PLAN

available at

http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NRPbaseplan.pdf.
47. Id. at i, 1-5.
48. Id. at 1, 17-21.
49. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE FOR THE NATIONAL RESPONSE

PLAN

21

(4.0

version

available

2006),

at

http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NRP-QuickReferenceGuide_5-22-06.pdf.
50. Id.
51.

N.Y. CITY DEP'T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS AND

RESPONSE PLAN 1 (2006), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/cd/cd-panfluplan.pdf.
52. Compare id., with U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 49, at 21.
53. N.Y. CITY DEP'T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, supra note 5

1,at

1.

54. See David L. Feinberg, Hurricane Katrina and the Public Health-BasedArgument for Greater
Federal Involvement in DisasterPreparednessand Response, 13 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 596 (2006);
Joseph B. Treaster & Deborah Sontag, Despair and Lawlessness Grip New Orleans as Thousands
Remained Stranded in Squalor, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2005, at Al.
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Systems like the NRP internalize serious shortcomings that flow from literal
command and control. Built-in assumptions mask important issues, such as the
absence of mechanisms for input and critique. Reliance on this paradigm sets in
motion a constellation of unspecified understandings. Potentially, the ramifications
extend beyond immediate needs, as new routines and different professional norms
channel the development of public health policymaking beyond emergency
situations. The structure reflected in the vocabulary of the NIMS, CIMS, and INS
systems may not be intrinsically problematic, but it bespeaks much bigger issues.
On purely instrumental grounds, a top-down, militarized, command and
control structure that fails to incorporate ground-up concerns and the divergent
material realities of differing communities can exacerbate the harms of a public
health emergency.55 Social science research has found that substantial portions of
the population express concerns that could dissuade them from following the
directions of public health officials, especially given significant levels of distrust
toward government.56 More active citizen engagement in identifying and working
through the barriers that impede public cooperation with emergency response
efforts might lead to more effective programs.
Overall, one must read the NRP for its silences as well as its mandates.
Hierarchial command can crowd out alternative mechanisms that would better
incorporate democratic practices and norms. The public health emergency context
presents a concrete example of the questions raised in debates on how to preserve
democratic values in a dangerous world. The headline value of pandemic flu
planning may not compare to debates over detainees in extraterritorial prisons, but
the former's quotidian nature should not cause us to overlook the possible gaps that
may occur in the practices essential to a democracy.
C.

ProblematizingEmergency To What Ends?

Disease outbreaks and natural disasters are real recurrent events, but how they
are conceptualized in government policy is changing. "Health emergency" is
becoming a powerful frame, a funding magnet for programmatic initiatives, and a
rapidly enlarging subfield of knowlege within public health. Both the evolving
legal architecture of health security, exemplified in the proposed quarantine
regulations, and the NRP-NIMS operational systems reflect this new discourse of
health emergency.
The key process underway is the refraining of preparedness for and response
to emergencies into an issue of health security. This process itself can redefine the
acceptable scope of state power and reshape bureaucracy. It has affected policy on

55. Thomas A. Glass & Monica Schoch-Spana, Bioterrorism and the People: How to Vaccinate a
City Against Panic, 34 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 217, 219-22 (2002); ROz D. LASKER, N.Y.
ACAD. OF MED., REDEFINING READINESS: TERRORISM PLANNING THROUGH THE EYES OF THE PUBLIC

(2004), available at http://www.cacsh.org/pdf/RedefiningReadinessStudy.pdf.
56. LASKER, supra note 55, at ii-iv, 10-12, 49.
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the use of federal troops for domestic law enforcement purposes, generally
forbidden.57 In 2006, in reaction to Hurricane Katrina and possibly in anticipation
of creating an option for military personnel to enforce quarantine, 58 Congress
enlarged the permissible scope of troop deployment to include threats to normal
law enforcement stemming from "natural disaster, epidemic, or other serious public
health emergency. 9
The expanded leeway provided by the 2006 amendment for federalizing the
police function and locating it within the military may in the future save lives or
enable oppressive uses of power or both. Calls to repeal it have noted that it was
enacted as part of a budget bill, with little congressional debate, although all fifty
state governors opposed it. 60 If it stands, it will have established a new marker for
the borders of authorizing military command.
Within and among agencies of government, the reframing of health
emergency and the new structure of preparedness systems have reshaped
bureaucracy. When the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established,
it absorbed both the lead agency for responding to emergencies and disasters-the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)-and the border patrol and
rescue functions of the Coast Guard. 6 ' In this reorganization model, security trumps
rescue.
What these examples signify is the building of health emergency as a new
frame for an old set of problems. The new frame itself creates new authorities, new
powers and the reassignment of power to new locations, and subtly altered ways of
thinking about the appropriate role of government. Social understandings of what
"public health" means and what its proper scope should be are part of what is
behind these changes.
II.

NEW GOVERNANCE IN PUBLIC HEALTH LAW

Given the definitively public sector nature of public health and its
accentuation by a trend toward greater top-down command authority and culture,
the remarkable development in the public health field today is that new governance
models are simultaneously taking root. In contrast to the traditional government
model, new governance theory stresses collaborative public and private efforts to

57. The Posse Comitatus Act forbids deployment of military troops for law enforcement purposes
unless authorized by Congress or the Constitution. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000).
58. David Brown, Military's Role in a Flu Pandemic; Troops Might Be Used to "Effect a
Quarantine," Bush Says, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2005, at A5.
59. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. 109-364, §
1076(a)(1), 120 Stat. 2083, 2404-05 (2006) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 333).
60. Editorial, Making MartialLaw Easier,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2007, at A 18.
61. See U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., History: Who Became Part of the Department?,
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/history/editorial_0 I33.shtm (last visited Mar. 2, 2007).
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address public policy issues. 6 2 The fact that both moves-toward public and toward
private-are happening simultaneously within public health illustrates the
dynamism of this field and makes it a particularly rich one for theoretical analysis.
In the following part, I sketch the parameters of the growing body of new
governance scholarship. I suggest that it is useful to identify two distinct branches
of new governance theory that offer different analyses and insights into state and
private power. I then describe how each branch of new governance theory is
currently finding expression in certain trends in public health law and policy.
Finally, I use the specific case of public health and the workplace to explicate how
the governmentality branch of new governance theory can help us better analyze
and critique the public-private power dynamics inherent in public health regulation.
A.

Dynamics Within New Governance Theory

"New governance" includes an extended epistemological family of
conceptual and operational understandings.63 All of these understandings address
the power exchanges between government and the private sector. The vernacular of
new governance is most evident in administrative and environmental law
scholarship. 64 In these academic areas, new governance has emerged as the
promotion of mediated self-regulation, interlaced with ongoing feedback between
industry and agency.65
What is largely absent from most legal scholarship in this area, however, is
the governmentality branch of governance theory. Michel Foucault first used the
term "governmentality" in 1978 to demarcate differences between government and
the state or, alternatively stated, to drive home the point that a range of institutions
66
outside of government interact with it to control and channel human behavior.

62. Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
ContemporaryLegal Thought, 89 MINN.L. REV. 342, 345-50 (2004).
63. See the exchange between Bradley C. Karkkainen, Reply: "New Governance" in Legal
Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471,
496 (2004) and Lobel, supra note 62, at 348, for a discussion of whether new governance is "not a single
model, but a loosely related family of alternative approaches to governance," as Karkkainen argues, or is
more fittingly described by Lobel as a "new legal model" with "dimensions ...operating together."
64. Both fields contain an enormous amount of work in new governance theory. Samples of
discussions of the theory's relevance in administrative law include: Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization,
Democracy, and the Needfor a New Administrative Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1687 (2002); Jody Freeman,
Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1997). For comparable
discussions in the area of environmental law, see GUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 13; CHARLES SABEL
ET AL., BEYOND BACKYARD ENVIRONMENTALISM (2000); Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law,
89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227 (1995).
65. E.g., Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and the New Administrative Law, in
RECRAFTING THE RULE OF LAW: THE LIMITS OF LEGAL ORDER 331, 346-50 (David Dyzenhaus ed.,

1999).
66. See

Michel

Foucault,

Governmentality, in

THE

FOUCAULT

GOVERNMENTALITY 87, 102-03 (Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991).
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work of political
One finds governmentality analysis more often in the
68
sociologists 67 and less often in the writings of legal scholars.
I identify and explicate below those two distinct branches of governance
theory, administrative governance and govemmentality, not because they are
completely independent. Both concern "the range of activities, functions, and
exercise of control by both public and private actors in the promotion of social,
political, and economic ends." 69 But there is a spectrum of ideas in the new
governance literature that is worth categorizing into these two distinct branches,
even at the risk of some simplification. The scholarship around administrative
governance tends to focus on structural forms and policy applications, while the
govemmentality literature tends to focus on theories of power and the attendant
roles and identities of public and private actors. Exploring how each of these
theories plays out today in public health law and policy can illustrate some of the
different ramifications of using one construct, rather than another, to analyze the
operations of the state.
1.

Administrative Governance

The administrative and regulatory wing of new governance theory rejects the
traditional public management approach of hierarchical command design with
centralized control. Instead, it embraces collaborative ventures that require
facilitation rather than coercion to achieve desired goals.7 ° It relies upon a network
of stakeholders working together to achieve outcomes, management by negotiation,
and dispersed networks rather then traditional methods of command and control.71
Its common themes include an increase in partnerships, flexibility, and negotiation.
It is a form of regulatory governance, albeit with a great deal of anti-regulatory
rhetoric.
Two books published in 1992 provided the groundwork for new
administrative governance theory in the United States. Responsive Regulation

67. NIKOLAS ROSE,

POWERS OF FREEDOM: REFRAMING

POLITICAL THOUGHT 48-50 (1999);

Nikolas Rose & Peter Miller, PoliticalPower Beyond the State: Problematicsof Government, 43 BRIT.
J. Soc. 173, 174 (1992).
68. Scott Burris and Jonathan Simon are two legal theorists who have drawn explicitly on
govemmentality principles. See, e.g., Scott Burrs, Governance, Microgovernanceand Health, 77 TEMP.
L. REV. 335 (2004) (applying a theory of nodal governance to health policy); Jonathan Simon, Driving
Governmentalitv: Automobile Accidents, Insurance, and the Challenge to Social Order in the Inter-War

Years, 1919 to 1941, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 521 (1998) (analyzing the effects of automobile-related liability
on risk regulation).
69. Lobel, supra note 62, at 344. Indeed, I would identify a third branch, concerned primarily with
the functioning of institutions, in the democratic experimentalist school of constitutional theory. See,
e.g., Michael C. Dorf& Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of DemocraticExperimentalism, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 267, 314-23 (1998).
70. Freeman, supra note 65, at 341-45.
71.

SALAMON, supra note 12, at 13-15.
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sought to "transcend the intellectual stalemate" 72 between old-line regulators and
market advocates by advocating a "trust but verify" regime in which agencies
would delegate much of their enforcement function to private actors, but retain
oversight and the capacity to step in with "big gun" mechanisms if industries
rejected change.73 A second book, Reinventing Government, written primarily for a
general audience, made a more limited
argument for introducing market discipline
74
and efficiency into the public sector.
Advocates of administrative governance celebrate anti-linearity and plasticity,
describing these new processes as "open-textured, participatory, bottom-up,
'' 5
integrative, and pragmatic. 1
flexible,
contextual,
consensus-oriented,
Administrative governance is presented more as methodology than ideology: "a
centrally coordinated and monitored system of parallel local experiments,
networked and disciplined through structured information disclosures and
monitoring requirements, subject to rolling minimum performance benchmarks but
otherwise free to experiment in a continuous and ceaseless effort to improve, learn,
76
and revise.,
In technology and in vocabulary, the goal stated within much administrative
governance literature is to jettison categories of regulators and regulatees in favor
of multi-stakeholder decision-making.77 Not surprisingly, the rhetorical construct of
new governance is anti-bureaucratic and anti-hierarchical, as well as dismissive
toward traditional boundaries between public and private sectors.78 Power flows not
only downward to the level closest to implementation, but also outward, to both the
for-profit and public interest branches of the private sector. 79 Transparency and
coordination predominate over mandates, and at any regulatory moment, a strong
preference attaches to the least prescriptive, efficacious alternative. 80 At the core of
new administrative technologies are multiple forms of public-private hybridization.
A central feature of administrative governance is integrating stakeholders and
communities to resolve complex public problems. Administrative governance,
unlike traditional government, is not organized around a single entity responsible
for public problem solving. Rather, it is a systemic concept that integrates
organization, policy-making, and network theories and utilizes an amalgamation of
tools and people for addressing social problems.

72. IAN

AYRES

&

JOHN

BRAITHWAITE,

RESPONSIVE

REGULATION:

TRANSCENDING

THE

DEREGULATION DEBATE 3 (1992).

73. Id. at 35-49.
74. DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE ENTREPRENEURIAL
SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR (1992).

75. Karkkainen, supra note 63, at 474.
76. Id. at 485.
77. Lobel, supra note 62, at 371-79.
78. GUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 13, at 4-10.
79. Lobel, supra note 62, at 345.
80. GUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 13, at 391-94.
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Governmentality Theory as an Alternative Lens

The strand of governance least discussed in legal literature is
"governmentality." If "new governance" generally celebrates a networked
structure, then its Foucauldian antecedent can be seen as a network theory of state
power, focused on a circulatory system rather than a set of defined partnerships.
The operative principle of governmentality is more that of inter-penetration than of
participatory administration. In general, govermmentality scholarship has a sharper
critical edge than the new administrative governance writings in the public policy
literature.
Governmentality approaches constitute "governing at a distance, ' 81 an idea
not captured by either the concepts of public-private partnership or self-regulation.
Rather, it refers to the utilization of private entities, through ongoing operations, to
channel and instantiate government policies. Governing at a distance involves
indirect forms of control, for which state and non-state entities establish a series of
norms as well as rules, ultimately leading individuals to guide themselves in certain
directions, toward certain ends. There is no sharp demarcation between political
entities and non-state spheres, such as the market or civil society. Rather,
Liberal rule is inextricably bound to the activities and calculations of a
proliferation of independent authorities-philanthropists, doctors,
hygienists, managers, planners, parents and social workers. It is
dependent upon the political authorization of the authority of these
authorities [and] upon the forging of alignments between political aims
and the strategies of experts ..... 8
Taken together, the scholarship on administrative governance and
governmentality mark a major shift in understandings of the role and functions of
the state. The field of public health-that quintessentially public sector venue for
the exercise of power-provides an excellent arena for testing and applying these
ideas.
B.

New Administrative Governance in Public Health

The administrative governance concepts of multi-stakeholder involvement
and decision-making can be seen in public health policy trends today. In 2003, the
Institute of Medicine (10M) recommended that the United States envision its public
health system as including partners from across society, including businesses and
other private actors. 83 The IOM report highlighted employers' interest in healthy

81. Rose & Miller, supra note 67, at 173; see ROSE, supra note 67, at 48-50.
82. ROSE, supra note 67, at 49. Some scholars, including Rose, would include state-private
partnerships as an example of governing at a distance. See Nikolas Rose, Government and Control, 40
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 321, 323-24 (2000). 1 develop administrative governance and governmentality
separately because I think that, especially for legal studies, the distinction serves to more fully highlight
the dimensions of each.
83. INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH IN THE 21 ST CENTURY 2-3 (2003).
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workers as sponsors of health insurance plans and their concern with occupational
and environmental health issues. 84 In response to, and in recognition of, the need
for "multisector actions that address the broad determinants of health,"
policymakers are starting
to call "for the business sector's participation in... [the]
85
public health system.,
In both planning and operations, public health departments are starting to
utilize new governance techniques. An example of the planning mode in action is
"Take Care New York," New York City's development of a set of target population
health goals for 2008.86 The City selected its goals based on the extent of disease
burden caused by each targeted health problem, each problem's amenability to
intervention, and whether each problem could "be best addressed through
coordinated action by City agencies, public-private partnerships, health care
providers, businesses, and individuals., 87 "Take Care New York" reiterates the
point made by the IOM: "[t]he public sector cannot and should not address these
health problems alone." 88 On the operations side, Sarah Gollust and Peter Jacobson
found public health department outsourcing of functions such as clinical testing and
primary care services. 89
Policy-making for public health emergencies heightens some of the dynamics
that propel new governance initiatives. Public health emergencies highlight the
strong needs shared by government and business for the maintenance of important
resources such as communications and transportation.9" For example, the DHS
pandemic influenza planning guide for private businesses calls for "fundamentally
integrated partnerships" between government agencies and the owners and
operators of businesses linked to infrastructure and other critical resources. 9' DHS
describes its "Sector Partnership Framework" as "built on an unprecedented level
92
of public-private cooperation.,

84. Id. at 268-300.
85. Paul A. Simon & Jonathan E. Fielding, PublicHealth and Business: A PartnershipThat Makes
Cents, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1029, 1030 (2006).
86. N.Y. CITY DEP'T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, TAKE CARE NEW YORK: A POLICY FOR A
HEALTHIER NEW YORK CITY 5 (2004).

87. Id. at 4.
88. Id. at 18; INST. OF MED., supra note 83, at 2-3.

89. Sarah E. Gollust & Peter D. Jacobson, Privitizationof Public Services: OrganizationalReform
Efforts in PublicEducation and Public Health, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1733, 1735 (2006).
90. The catastrophic consequences of infrastructure breakdown became abundantly evident in a
planning exercise centered on a possible outbreak of pneumonic plague. See Thomas V. Inglesby et al.,
A Plague on Your City: Observationsfrom TOPOFF,32 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 436 (2001).
91. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND
RECOVERY: GUIDE FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND KEY RESOURCES 66 (2005), available at

http://www.fcc.gov/pandemic-flu-guide.pdf.
92. Id. at 67.
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Indeed, public health emergency planning discourse and "smart regulation"
arguments have merged. A Century Foundation analysis of homeland security
epitomizes the harmonization:
The development of an appropriate security posture for each of the
sectors that need to be defended hinges on a detailed understanding of
industry operations and risk management practices. Owners and
operators are in a better position than the government to know how to
translate homeland security goals and objectives into specific standards
and operating procedures for their industries and companies. Close
collaboration and coordination between the sectors and government are
therefore indispensable.
Smart regulation focuses on results or end-states rather than dictating
how those results should be achieved.93
Anticipating the specific dynamics of an infectious disease emergency, public
health leaders have started developing models for collaboration with businesses.
The CDC Foundation commissioned a "lessons learned" study of how public health
and business leaders in Toronto dealt with Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS). The study concluded that "the patterns of business/government leadership
are significantly altered during a public health emergency due to the economic
consequences of the events. The business community became directly involved in
the resolution of the public health situation. This leadership shift can be planned for
in advance .... ..
The United Nations System Coordinator for influenza
concluded, after a pandemic flu simulation at the 2006 meeting of the World
Economic Forum, that "[e]ngaging business from the start is not a luxury-it is
essential and perhaps the most important factor of all." 95
These collaborative efforts illustrate a trend which will surely grow.96
Although new public-private collaborations are more advanced in the remainder of
the health care industry,9 7 the trend toward incorporating business community
participation in governance, in part to expand the reach of public health
interventions, is likely to increase. The premium placed on emergency preparedness
will only accelerate this process.

93. RICHARD A. CLARKE & RAND BEERS, CENTURY FOUND., THE FORGOTTEN HOMELAND 67-68

(2006).
94. GENE MATTHEWS, CDC FOUND., THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE RESPONSE TO SUDDEN DISEASE
OUTBREAK 6 (2005), availableat http://www.cdcfoundation.org/sitefiles/TorontoReport.pdf.
95. Booz ALLEN HAMILTON, INFLUENZA PANDEMIC SIMULATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PUBLIC

AND PRIVATE SECTORS 5 (2006).

96. In an example that presumably will be replicated, New York City's planning for an influenza
outbreak has included meetings "with all ... critical infrastructure partners." Isaac B. Weisfuse et al.,
Pandemic Influenza Planning in New York City, 83 J. URBAN HEALTH 351, 352, 354 (2006).
97. See, e.g., Louise G. Trubek, New Governance and Soft Law in Health Care Reform, 3 IND.
HEALTH L. REV. 139, 148, 156 (2006).
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These developments signify the arrival of administrative governance
principles and reforms based on public-private partnerships in public health. Their
utilization will synchronize the management of public health programs with
programs in other fields which also use these approaches.
C.

Governmentality in Public Health

The experiences of various countries with SARS, and the fears of a possible
pandemic flu, have generated policy proposals from different sources that go
beyond proposing simply structural private-public partnerships, and engage in more
focused, although indirect, governing at a distance. These public health policy ideas
illustrate governmentality in action through the assumption of new roles and
identities for private actors.
During 2003, waves of SARS struck Hong Kong, Shanghai, Taipei, and
Toronto, resulting in 8,098 probable cases and 774 deaths. 98 In Toronto, 30,000
individuals lived under quarantine. 99 Almost all of these individuals complied
voluntarily with quarantine recommendations, and in only twenty-seven cases was
it necessary for courts to issue enforcement orders.' 00 These figures suggest that a
widespread instinct to protect oneself by seeking shelter at home during a disease
outbreak provided the basis for close to total "compliance." Public health officials
realized that although exhortations to stay home were not enforceable, they
effectively curbed the spread of the disease. Using a model based on voluntary
actions had the additional advantage of not requiring health officials to obtain and
implement legally binding orders.' l
This form of "modem quarantine," which depends on voluntary action rather
than coercive state action, has been further developed in the public health literature
since the SARS outbreak. David Heyman, a political scientist at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, has promoted the concept of "disease exposure
control," designed to maximize voluntary actions of social distancing. 10 2 Heyman
argues that not only will the public be more accepting of such an approach, but that
it will be essential in situations in which society confronts an infectious disease

Health
Org.,
SARS,
W.
Pac.,
World
Office
for
the
98. Reg'l
http://www.wpro.who.inthealth-topics/sars/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
99. Martin Cetron & Pattie Simone, Battling 21st-Century Scourges with a 14th-Century Toolbox,
10 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 2053, 2053 (2004). Approximately the same number of persons
were quarantined in Beijing and more than 13 1,000 persons were placed under quarantine in Taiwan. Id.
at 2053-54.
100. Id. at 2053.
101. WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO PANDEMIC INFLUENZA DRAFT PROTOCOL FOR RAPID RESPONSE
at
2006),
available
14
(draft
May
30,
AND
CONTAINMENT

http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian-influenza/guidelines/protocolfinal30 -5-06a.pdf.
102. CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES HOMELAND SEC. PROGRAM, MODEL OPERATIONAL
2,
2005), available at
CONTROL
(draft Nov.
GUIDELINES FOR
DISEASE EXPosURE
[hereinafter MODEL OPERATIONAL
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/051102_dec-.guidelines.pdf
GUIDELINES].
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outbreak without adequate pharmaceutical resources for vaccinations or treatments
03
to curb transmission.

In policy documents, although not in formal regulations, the CDC has also
been developing the concept of "modem quarantine," under which the coercive
10 4
orders set forth in its proposed regulations would become largely irrelevant.
"Modem quarantine" does not abandon the authority to issue involuntary
quarantine orders, 10 5 but its primary thrust is a form of soft law. It prioritizes a
voluntary approach to quarantine, suggesting implicitly that the kind of powers
10 6
sought in the proposed regulations will apply in limited instances.
The modem quarantine approach has also led the CDC to consider resource
questions that it elided in the traditional coercive approach set forth in its proposed
regulations on quarantine. In its policy document, the CDC explains that modem
quarantine should be used only when several preconditions are met.' 07 One of these
10 8
preconditions is that "[r]esources are available to care for quarantined people."'
The policy document also states that "[q]uarantined individuals will be sheltered,
fed, and cared for .... They will also be among the first to receive all available
medical interventions . .

.,109

By contrast, the CDC's proposed regulations on quarantine contain no
commitment to those individuals who may be subject to coercive state orders. The
proposed regulations state that persons subject to coercive orders "may receive care
and treatment" at the CDC's expense, 10 but that such provision is discretionary and
subject to the availability of appropriations."'
The CDC's approach to modem quarantine also differs from Heyman's on
one key point. The CDC's influenza plan states that "[iun the event voluntary
measures are not successful, it may be necessary to implement mandatory
containment measures,"'"l 2 but the agency does not commit itself to the principle
that less restrictive alternatives should be exhausted before officials resort to

103. Id. at 19, 25-26.
104. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., HHS PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLAN S8-27 to -28

(Supp. 8 2005), available at http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/pdf/HHSPandemiclnfluenzaPlan.pdf
[hereinafter U.S.

DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.].

105. Id. at S8-10.
106. Id. at S8-29. In its answers to Frequently Asked Questions, the CDC states that it defines
quarantine "when used clinically or programmatically" to include persons who voluntarily sequester
themselves. Id. "[E]ven when ... restrictions are voluntary, the person is said to be under quarantine."
Id.
107. Id. at S8-27.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Control of Communicable Diseases, 70 Fed. Reg. 71,892, 71,934 (proposed Nov. 30, 2005) (to
be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 70).
111. Id. at 71,934.
112. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., supra note 104, at S8-29.
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coercion.113 By contrast, the fourth principle of Heyman's model is that "[d]isease
using the least restrictive means
exposure control programs should be designed
'1 14
necessary to control the spread of disease."
Whatever its internal ambivalences, the CDC has proposed a set of "modem
quarantine" principles that serve a powerful political end, proffering a way to
harmonize community needs and individual rights. They present an opportunity for
government officials to shed a legacy of abusiveness and bigotry related to
quarantine' l 5 and instead to build efficacy on public acceptance of measures seen as
protective rather than restrictive. 16 The conflict between public health and civil
liberties has bedeviled public health officials, such that the tension became a
standard refrain during the 1980s phase of AIDS.' 17 "Modem quarantine" is meant
to resolve the conventional liberty versus community debate by producing a happy
equilibrium, as this CDC PowerPointTM slide 1 8 illustrates:

113. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
114. MODEL OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 102, at 23.
115. Historical examples of the misuse of public healih powers abound. Two of the most frequently
cited instances of officials using ethnic identifiers rather than scientific principles to designate parts of a
city for restrictions are the quarantine of San Francisco's Chinatown during a plague epidemic and the
use of quarantine against immigrants in New York City's Lower East Side. E.g., MARILYN CHASE, THE
BARBARY PLAGUE: THE BLACK DEATH IN VICTORIAN SAN FRANCISCO (2003); HOWARD MARKEL,
QUARANTINE!: EAST EUROPEAN JEWISH IMMIGRANTS AND THE NEW YORK CITY EPIDEMICS OF 1892

(1997).
116. "Experiences with the use of quarantine during the SARS outbreaks of 2003 suggest that public
acceptance of quarantine may be greater than previously thought." U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., supra note 104, at S8-30.
117. E.g., Wendy E. Parmet, Legal Rights and Communicable Dipo
eares AIDS, the Police Power, and
Individual Liberty, 14 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 741 (1989).
118. Div. of Global Migration & Quarantine, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Quarantine:
Community
Response
and
Containment
for
SARS,
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidodsars/ppt/quarantineslides 10303.ppt (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
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"Modem quarantine" discourse illustrates govemmentality in action. Its
ramifications extend beyond the calls for new forms of regulation that characterize
much of the administrative governance wing of new governance scholarship. Its
planning documents do not seek to establish ongoing public-private partnerships. It
is not a more collaborative form of regulating particular industries overseen by an
agency. Instead, "modem quarantine" principles would operate by indirection.
Their efficacy would depend on inducement and enablement. Calls for "social
distancing" and self-quarantine seek to elicit voluntary behaviors, but ones which
nevertheless would occur in the shadow of the law. Specific practices experienced
as autonomous would align with the objectives of a regulatory strategy. Modem
quarantine provides a contemporary example of the govemmentality dynamic in
action.
III.

WORKPLACES AS PART OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEM: INSIGHTS FROM
GOVERNMENTALITY THEORY

Public health policies such as modem quarantine and disease exposure control
would be announced and put into place by government officials. But the
effectiveness of these public policies would require active facilitation by various
institutions and social systems, including, most importantly, by employers. Using
the insights of governmentality theory, we can explore the role that employers
would assume in response to an outbreak of infectious disease that could not be
quickly curbed by medications as a case study of how governing at a distance
would operate in an epidemic. The complex interrelationships and interpenetrations
of power required to make "modem quarantine" work provide a good example of
the power dynamics revealed by a govemmentality analysis. I conclude that such
an analysis reveals a paradox: to make the role played by employers effective to
achieve health goals will require more active intervention by the state in areas of
law other than public health law.
A.

The Role of Employers

The CDC has acknowledged that its modem quarantine approach cannot
succeed without adequate material support for individuals who will be asked to
remain at home voluntarily rather than continue working. In the
"Recommendations for Quarantine" appendix to its pandemic flu plan, the CDC
includes the following caution for public health agencies: "[p]rovide persons in
quarantine with all needed support services .... Financial issues, such as medical
leave, may also need to be considered." ' 19
The role of the state vis-A-vis employers has also been explored by the CDC.
A report commissioned by the CDC on lessons learned from the responses of
various countries to SARS noted that "[b]ecause the success of quarantine

119. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., supra note 104, at S8-31.
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depended on compliance by the affected individuals, all of the countries we studied
took some steps to provide for income replacement and employment security of
individuals in quarantine."' 120 For example, during the SARS outbreak, the
Canadian province of Ontario enacted legislation that provided material
compensation to individuals under formal or even recommended quarantine
conditions. Individuals who could not work because they were ill, under medical
supervision, or providing care to someone with SARS, were entitled to job
protection in the form of leave without pay. 121 Individuals who self-quarantined
were required to obtain a medical certificate within two days of being quarantined
in order to receive benefits. 122 Health care workers unable to work because of
SARS received unemployment benefits and financial assistance with tax and
mortgage payments. 123

Ontario was not the only jurisdiction to adopt enabling legislation for public
health purposes. Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan enacted legislation providing
unemployment benefits for persons who were unable to work during the124 SARS
epidemic and death benefits for the families of those who died from SARS.
While SARS offers the most recent example of using workplace benefits as a
health mechanism, the idea itself has earlier origins in international law. The
Convention on Medical Care and Sickness Benefits outlines basic requirements
expected from signatory nations with regard to medical care and sickness
benefits. 125 In 1969, the International Labour Organization (ILO), which is
affiliated with the United Nations and the World Health Organization, adopted a
Recommendation that sickness benefits should include cash awards to compensate
for loss of earnings caused by obtaining medical care or because an individual has
been quarantined. 126 In 2004, the ILO's permanent secretariat, the International
Labour Office, prepared an analysis of workplace issues related to SARS. In that
report, the ILO reiterated its conclusion that individuals who fail to seek medical
care or fail to remain at home when appropriate for them to do so can vastly
increase the velocity of transmission of an infectious disease and, therefore, some

120. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., QUARANTINE AND ISOLATION: LESSONS LEARNED FROM SARS:
A REPORT TO THE CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 14 (2003), available at

http://archive.naccho.org/documents/Quarantine-Isolation-Lessons-Leamed-from-SARS.pdf.
countries studied were Canada, China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Id. at 6.
121. SARS Assistance and Recovery Strategy Act, S.O., ch. 1, § 6(1) (2003) (Can.).
122. Id. at §6(2).
123. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 120, at 58.
124. Id. at 139.

The

125. INT'L LABOUR ORG., C130 MEDICAL CARE AND SICKNESS BENEFITS CONVENTION, 1969,
available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C130. For a list of signatories to the
convention, visit http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/ratifce.pl?C 130. The United States has not ratified the
Medical Care and Sickness Benefits Convention.

126. INT'L LABOUR ORG., R134 MEDICAL CARE AND SICKNESS BENEFITS RECOMMENDATION Art. 8

available
(1969),
http://wallis.kezenfogva.iif.hu/eu-konyvtar/Projektek/Vocational-Rehabilitiation/instr/r_
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at
134.htm.
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forms of "social protection" are necessary for health purposes. 127 The 2004 report
also defined "quarantine" as a form of preventive health care, thus bringing it
within the scope of its original Convention-and not simply the ILO's 1969
128
Recommendation-on Medical Care and Sickness Benefits.
Since SARS, the largest public health planning exercise in the United States
has been in anticipation of pandemic influenza. In May 2006, the United States
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) published a comprehensive
"implementation plan" for its national strategy of preparedness. 129 The DHS
Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan (DHS Plan) recognizes that "the
development of public-private partnership is paramount to securing our Nation's
[critical infrastructure] assets."'3 °
As the DHS Plan notes, pandemic flu would not affect physical facilities or
infrastructure, but it would nonetheless threaten critical functions because of its
impact on the population. According to the DHS Plan, up to forty percent of
workers could be sick for up to two weeks at the height of the pandemic, with
lower absentee levels for shorter periods during the weeks before and after the
peak. 13 1 As a result, the DHS Plan declares that "effective continuity planning
including protection of personnel . . . is a 'good business practice' that must
become part of the fundamental mission of all . . . private sector businesses and
institutions .... 132

However, the DHS Plan only weakly acknowledges the basic lesson of
SARS: workplace policies are critical to preventing disease transmission and are
not merely an afterthought or aside. In discussing protection of personnel, the DHS
Plan identifies "infection control measures" that would minimize workplace
exposure to influenza, including "allowing unscheduled and non-punitive leave for
employees with ill household contacts."' 33 Another section of the DHS Plan
discusses "social distancing," advising that "businesses should prepare for the
possibility of measures that have the potential to disrupt their business
continuity.' 34
Neither portion of this infection control advice in the DHS Plan addresses
how or by whom emergency leave policies would be financed. The DHS Plan is
somewhat more specific in its preparedness checklist section for employers, but
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implicitly assigns responsibility to each private entity. The DHS Plan urges
employers to "[e]stablish policies for employee compensation and sick leave
absences unique to a pandemic (e.g., non-punitive, liberal leave), including policies
on when a previously ill person is no longer infectious and can return to work after
illness. 135
Other sections of the DHS Plan are similarly vague. The DHS Plan identifies
population groups who might be at higher risk of severe or fatal infections, and
recommends that employers- consider reassignment of such persons to jobs with
less risk of exposure or "flexibility (where appropriate) in terms of worksite or
work hours."' 36 Finally, the DHS Plan discusses the "social risk" of employees
without health insurance:
Some employees may be at increased personal risk during a pandemic
because of limited access to health care services or other special needs.
Risk reduction planning for such employees should be
individualized.137
138
The CDC, in addition to the 2005 plan on pandemic flu described above,
has also issued a "planning guidance" document directed primarily to state and
local health officials. 139 This 2007 document describes voluntary quarantine as part
of a mitigation strategy that "would, in all likelihood, be implemented in most
communities at some point during a pandemic." 40 Mitigation through the use of
nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) such as voluntary quarantine, designed to
reduce the opportunities for exposure and transmission, would be necessary
because officials1 expect that effective vaccines would not become available for four

to six months.

14

CDC's planning guidance document calls. for health officials to "[e]nable
institution of workplace leave policies that align incentives and facilitate adherence
with" NPIs. 142 It recognizes that "the requirements for success" for NPIs include
the "commitment of employers to support the -recommendation" for voluntary
to provide needed support to households that
quarantine 143 as well as "the ability
14 4
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The CDC planning guidance contains a franker acknowledgment than the
DHS Plan of the financial commitments that would be required for modem
quarantine to be feasible. It anticipates widespread absenteeism from work for
twelve weeks, 145 six times longer than the DHS estimate. 146 In doing so, the plan
reflects a more thorough sense of the dynamics of channeling both public and
private action toward a public health good.
The shallowness of the DHS Plan illustrates how a superficial use of
administrative governance rhetoric can amount to an attempt to do new governance
on the cheap. The DHS Plan uses the administrative governance language of
partnership but engages sub silentio in an attempted outsourcing of financial
responsibility to the private sector. It highlights a focus on enlisting private
businesses as planning partners but implicitly rejects any shared responsibility
between the state and private businesses in terms of enabling employees to adhere
to social distancing plans.
Ultimately, however, both agencies blink. Neither addresses how either
employers or the government would ensure that the necessary resources would be
available to those who comply with modem quarantine. It is to those details that I
now turn. Explicating the limitations of existing law can help demonstrate the
potential need for state intervention in areas other than public health law.
B.

Making Modern QuarantineWork

The effectiveness of modem quarantine relies on the public's willingness to
remain at home voluntarily to avoid exposure and possible transmission of an
infectious disease. Public opinion poll data document that a common popular
concern about quarantine during an infectious disease outbreak pertains to how
persons would maintain themselves and their families if they could not work. 47 A
poll commissioned by the CDC found that seventy-six percent of respondents
believed that they would have serious financial problems if they had to miss work
for three months. 148 Even exposed or infected workers without sick leave benefits
would likely report for work when they could not afford the loss of income, just as
persons without health insurance might continue to work and engage in other
activities without seeking medical care.
In thinking about the practical details of quarantine, it is useful to categorize
three types of individuals who might be at risk of losing essential material support
during an emergency. The first group, which I call the Under Order (UO) group,
includes persons who are under a formal order to remain away from work. This

145. Id. at 51.
146. See supra text at note 131.
147. Robert J. Blendon et al., Attitudes Toward the Use of Quarantinein a Public Health Emergency
(2006),
W21-22
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148. HHS PLANNING GUIDANCE, supra note 139, at 50.
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may be an order to remain in isolation because these individuals are already ill from
an infectious disease, to remain in quarantine because these individuals are known
to have been exposed to an infectious disease, or to remain in quarantine because of
a possibility of having been exposed. The second group, which I call the SelfProtective (SP) group, includes persons who are engaged in self-protective,
voluntary separationfrom others, so as to avoid possible exposure to an infectious
disease or because they have self-identified possible exposures that have already
occurred. Finally, the third group, which I call the Care-Taking (CT) group,
includes persons engaged in caretaking activities for persons who need assistance
and who remain at home for any of the reasons noted above.
The success or failure of modem quarantine would turn on the degree of
cooperation by persons in the SP and CT groups. As a result, three topics within
employment law carry enormous import for public health emergencies. Job
protection, income replacement, and access to health care would make or break
CDC's plan. Its 2007 planning guidance acknowledges the first two issues in one
paragraph, 149 but fails to engage the questions in a serious way. Each example
illustrates the dense connections between workplace law and policy questions and
the public health system's capacity to curb disease transmission.
1.

Job Protection

In the United States, no federal law and very few state laws guarantee that an
individual's job will be preserved if he or she must be absent during an emergency.
Some modernized statutes, resulting from a retooling of public health law to
incorporate due process standards, focus on individually ordered isolation or
quarantine. 150 This scope provides neither assurance to persons who respond to
official requests to limit their activities, but who are not under any formal order,
nor to persons in the SP or CT groups. Yet another model uses labor law to protect
jobs for persons who follow emergency orders such as evacuation.1 51 However,
these laws leave important questions regarding coverage unanswered.
The DHS Plan recommends that employers provide "non-punitive, liberal
leave" but provides no further details on how such leave would be provided or the
conditions accompanying such leave. 5 2 The only existing federal leave law that
might be used as a model, the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), '5 is too

149. Id. at 52.
150. New Mexico's relevant provision, for example, specifies that protection extends to "a person
who is placed in isolation or quarantine pursuant to the provisions" of state law. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 121OA-16 (LexisNexis Cumulative Supp. 2003). The statute establishes a process by which health officials
would identify particular individuals and seek a court order of isolation or quarantine. Id. at § 12-IOA-7.
151. A Texas state law makes it unlawful to fire or discriminate against employees who leave their
places of employment to obey a general public evacuation order issued during an emergency. TEX. LAB.
CODE ANN. § 22.002 (Vernon 2006).
152. HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, supra note 28, at 183.

153. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 etseq. (2000).
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incomplete to serve a population health function. The FMLA guarantees up to
twelve weeks of unpaid leave for persons who have a "serious health condition" or
persons who need the time off to care for a newborn or newly adopted child, or for
a child, spouse or parent with a serious health condition. 154 A "serious health
condition" is defined as one involving inpatient care or continuing treatment by a
health care provider. 55 However, it applies only to employers with fifty or more
employees, leaving very small workplaces and self-employed workers
uncovered. 156 Workers must also have been employed for at least one year and
must meet minimal hour per week standards. 57 Caring for anyone not included in
the statutory list-such as a grandchild, domestic partner, or neighbor-would
disqualify the worker from using leave under the FMLA. Thus, while an alreadyinfected person would meet the criteria for having a "serious health condition,"
someone who had merely been exposed but was not ill, or who was taking
precautions against exposure by staying at home, would not qualify. A few state
leave laws provide more coverage, 158 but workers in most states are governed by
the federal law.
Other legal mechanisms may redress or compensate for inequities after the
fact, but do not provide the advance assurance that would provide optimal
incentives for people to change their behavior in the midst of an emergency. The
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) would prohibit firing an individual because
he or she has a disability, or once had a disability, or is perceived to be disabled, or
associates with someone who is disabled. 5 9 The ADA could apply if an employee
was fired because of a serious injury or illness resulting from an emergency if the
general statutory criteria were met. Given the limited scope of the coverage of the
interpretations, the utility of the
ADA, however, based on the recent Supreme Court
60
limited.'
severely
be
would
regard
this
in
ADA
An even less likely source of protective law is the public policy exception to
the employment-at-will doctrine, which rarely succeeds. Courts generally uphold
an employer's right to discharge workers, absent a specific statutory barrier,
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allowing only narrow exceptions.161 Judicial reluctance to invalidate a job
62
termination has carried over to emergencies.'
2.

Income Replacement

The principle of income replacement for persons who cannot work during a
health emergency is well established in the abstract. The ILO's 1969
Recommendation provided for income replacement to individuals under
quarantine. 63 All of the countries most affected by the SARS outbreak in 2003
adopted laws that provided some form of monetary compensation to persons who
were under quarantine or who had been advised to remain at home.' 64 In the United
States, as with the issue of job protection, some laws already exist which could be
used to provide income replacement, but they are incomplete.
One model for income replacement in existing American law is the
unemployment compensation benefits system. As a threshold matter, however,
individuals who did not lose their jobs, but who received unpaid leave, would not
qualify for unemployment compensation. 165 These individuals would be protected
in the sense that they would have a job to return to when they became able to work
again, and their membership in a workplace health insurance plan, if their employer
sponsored one, would continue. 66 But they could not receive unemployment
benefits.
A special set of unemployment benefits does exist for persons who lose their
jobs because of an emergency. The Stafford Act, a federal disaster response law,
provides for but does not require federally ordered unemployment compensation
benefits if a national disaster is declared. 167 In addition, the President has broad
authority under the Stafford Act to provide financial assistance to individuals for
"necessary expenses or serious needs" including property and transportation
expenses. 168 Federal gap-filling legislation amending the Stafford Act could
provide a mechanism for addressing the current absence of income protection

161. See, e.g., Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24, 29 (Okla. 1989); Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd.,
771 P.2d 1033, 1049 (Utah 1989); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 840 (Wis. 1983).
162. Weyenberg Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Seidl, 410 N.W.2d 604, 607 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987); contra
Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 913 P.2d 377, 386 (Wash. 1996).
163. INT'L LABOUR ORG., supra note 126.

164. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 120, at 58-59, 139.
165. See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1252 (1986); State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Dep. Dir.,
Div. of Unemployment & Training, 845 N.E.2d 395, 400 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (concluding that an
employee must have been discharged or forced to leave by such urgent reasons as to render the
departure involuntary). States may impose a waiting period during which the applicant must be
unemployed and seeking work before benefits can begin. See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1253(d)
(1986 & West 2007). See generally Alan J. Jacobs & Lisa Zakolski, Unemployment Compensation, 76
AM. JUR. 2D Unemployment Compensation § 1 (2006).
166. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(c)(1) (2000).
167. 42 U.S.C. § 5177 (2000).
168. Id. § 5174(e)(2).
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guarantees for persons on unpaid leave in any of the three categories (UO, SP, or
CT) of vulnerable workers. However, emergency planning documents do not
indicate that this option is being considered.
3.

Access to Health Care

Medical care is an especially complex question. Virtually all Americans
younger than sixty-five who have health insurance receive it through a workplace
group plan,' 69 another reason why preserving one's job is essential, because
termination from employment also means termination of health insurance. More
than forty million Americans, however, have no health insurance, nor are they
covered by public programs such as Medicare or Medicaid." 7 An emergencyspecific response is possible. In the wake of September 1lth, federal, state, and
New York City officials liberalized the eligibility criteria for Medicaid for those
affected by that disaster.' 7 ' The Stafford Act allows, but does not require, the
federal government to provide financial assistance "to meet disaster-related
medical, dental, and funeral expenses. 172 Again, current planning documents do
not indicate that any thought has been given to such possibilities.
The point of this brief review of employment law is not to identify oversights
or suggest fixes, but to make a deeper point about the structure of this kind of
administrative policy. The CDC and DHS documents reflect different levels of
engagement with new governance approaches, but neither fully confronts the issue
of how much government intervention in employment law would be required in
order to make a voluntary modem quarantine system work. If employers are
effectively to facilitate quarantine-not because of some explicit partnership
structure with the state, but because of how a policy like voluntary quarantine
would operate-it will not be sufficient for government to simply exhort employers
to be good citizens. This enlistment of employers to carry out state functions would
necessitate the state becoming more interventionist in employment law. A
genuinely workable emergency public health law will require comparable
emergency employment and income protection law.

169. INST. OF MED., supra note 83, at 269.
170. Id. at 215. Recent data indicate that the number of individuals in the United States with no
health insurance is close to 47 million. Robert Pear, Without Health Benefits, A Good Life Turns Fragile,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2007, at Al.
171. Kathryn Haslanger, Radical Simplification: Disaster Relief Medicaid in New York City, 22
HEALTH AFF. 252, 253 (2003).
172. 42 U.S.C. § 5174(e)(1) (2000). The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act recommends
that states enact laws providing that isolated and quarantined persons shall receive "adequate food,
clothing, shelter,.., medication and competent medical care." CTR. FOR LAW & THE PUB.'S HEALTH AT
GEORGETOWN & JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVS., THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT 28

(2001), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf. New Mexico law
contains a comparable provision. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-IOA-8(B)(5) (LexisNexis Cumulative Supp.
2003). As with the state's job protection provisions, this protection extends only to persons against
whom a formal public health order has been issued. Id. § 12-1OA-8(B).
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CONCLUSION: RETHINKING THE PUBLIC HEALTH "SYSTEM"

Traditionally, we have assumed that the law of public health is essentially the
cluster of issues revolving around the operations of the government agencies that
comprise the public health system. The changes in the foundational strata
underlying the public health field that I have identified in this article call that
assumption into question. The architecture of governance in the public health field
is in flux, with trends moving in multiple and sometimes contradictory directions.
Some government authorities are proposing sweeping authorities for detention and
surveillance and pressing for tighter command procedures in responding to all
forms of emergencies. Other policy-making bodies are generating infrastructure
partnership models, and yet others are advocating indirect modes of disease control
that will ultimately depend as much on employment law as public health law. The
increasing role of trans-national governance structures further complicates the
field.173
The changes happening today in public health have broad resonance. Some
open up a new angle of vision into the national security state. Other aspects of
emergency planning illustrate subtle technologies of governance that operate at
multiple points of public-private intersection. An employer can, in a subtle way,
take on the functions of a quarantine agent, even as individual citizens incorporate
new disciplines of health into their daily lives. In these ways, health emergency
planning adds another layer to the biopower of the state, in its potential to shift how
we understand the identities associated with citizenship and regulation.
In both branches of the new governance discourse emerging in public health,
economic issues are central. New governance approaches within the health
emergency framework explicitly foreground the principle that a key component of
population health and national security is a healthy and secure economy.
Thoughout discussions of infectious disease emergenices, biological incapacity at
the individual level aligns with economic incapacity at the collective level. The
prescriptions of economic health policy are directed to employers, who are advised
to review what their legal obligations are for providing leave, 7 4 and individuals,
who are told to "[c]onsider maintaining a cash reserve. ,,175
Using a new governance lens to think about the multiple directions for policymaking operating within public health provides a richer sense of how this field is
increasingly knit together with broader trends in American government. There has
not yet been substantial crossover between new governance theory and national
security analysis. Public health emergency policy presents both sets of issues.
The sum of these developments should also encourage us to rethink how we
define the boundaries of a public health system or of public health law. If public

173. Fidler, supra note 1, at 158.
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health law consists of the legal doctrine most fundamental to the operation of the
public health system, then its scope will change as the system itself changes,
becoming reconfigured as emergency and security law and expanding into the
private sector. Regulating population health is multi-faceted and multi-sectoral and,
increasingly, the product of government-private sector partnership. It is also wired
into aspects of law that, on their face, do not address health.
Today's changes in the field of public health take us back in some ways, to
fears associated with infectious diseases that lacked effective cures or vaccines. But
these changes also move us ahead toward new understandings of what practices
constitute government and governance. This dynamism creates challenges for those
who analyze and teach public health law, as well as for our students. In the future,
practitioners of what constitutes public health law in these redefined terms will
include not just lawyers for traditional public health agencies and public health care
systems, but also attorneys who work in a wide array of private law fields as well.
Focusing on theories of governance is one important way to link the public health
field to broader understandings of society, to convey its intellectual richness, and to
prepare students for critical practice.
From a more theoretical perspective, public health law offers the opportunity
to study the interaction of varying models of governance as they develop, in real
time. Policy texts and the practices they signify constitute a portion of that law, if
we understand law to encompass the full range of discourses and institutions that
regulate behavior. Perhaps most significantly, public health policy has become a
venue for insinuating the normalization of emergency discourse into nonemergency governmental policy-making.

